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Corporation earlier this year. Join-
ing Boston Scientific in this effort 
was Abbott Laboratories, which 
paid $5 billion for Guidant’s en-
dovascular-device business. The 
outcome could hardly have been 
anticipated when Johnson & John-
son agreed to purchase Guidant 
for $25 billion in December 2004. 
In the wake of disclosures of 
lawsuits over allegedly defective 
Guidant devices, Guidant agreed 
to reduce the purchase price to 
$21.5 billion. Then Boston Scien-
tific stepped in with a higher of-
fer and won, in the end, with a 
bid valued at $27.5 billion — sub-
stantially more than Boston Scien-
tific’s own market value of $20 
billion.
Winning a common-value auc-
tion — in which the item should 
have the same worth to all the 
bidders — is seldom an unmixed 
triumph. According to economist 
Richard Thaler, if all the bidders 
are well informed, the winner is 
likely to have overvalued the prize 
— and to come to regret the de-
cision, suffering the winner’s 
curse. But sometimes the high-
est assessment of value is most 
nearly correct, and sometimes the 
object is worth more to the win-
ning bidder than to others.
Second-guessing about the 
wisdom of the Guidant purchase 
began well before April 21, 2006, 
when the deal was consummat-
ed. Guidant’s cardiovascular de-
vices could be lifesaving. But a 
stream of news about product de-
fects alarmed patients, physicians, 
and regulators. There were warn-
ings that two models of Guidant’s 
implantable cardioverter–defi-
brillators could short-circuit and 
had caused two deaths; some 
pacemaker models failed to fire 
appropriately; and defects in coro-
nary stent-delivery systems pre-
vented the angioplasty balloon 
from deflating, which could lead 
to emergency bypass surgery or 
death. The damage to Guidant’s 
reputation was accompanied by 
drops in its market share and the 
value of its stock. Opponents of 
the acquisition noted that the 
$27 billion bid represented 80 
times Guidant’s earnings — a ra-
tio that could be justified only 
by the expectation of explosive 
growth.
There is a broad consensus 
that the device industry, like the 
drug industry, will grow as baby 
boomers age. Some diagnostic de-
vices, such as magnetic resonance 
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n one of the most dramatic corporate acquisi-
tions in recent memory, Boston Scientific, a large 
manufacturer of medical devices, outbid industry 
giant Johnson & Johnson to purchase Guidant 
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imaging and computed tomo-
graphic scanners, have revolution-
ized the practice of medicine. 
Therapeutic devices also offer 
unique benefits. Electrical stim-
ulators are used to treat refrac-
tory pain and several neurologic 
diseases. Drug-eluting stents have 
become a mainstay of the treat-
ment of coronary artery disease, 
and implantable defibrillators 
reduce mortality among patients 
at high risk for sudden death from 
cardiac causes. The success of 
these innovations demonstrates 
that device companies that de-
velop new, effective products offer 
the prospect of better treatment 
for patients and higher returns 
for investors.
But not all companies are 
equally well positioned to bene-
fit from the anticipated increase 
in sales of medical devices. Large 
device companies, like large phar-
maceutical firms, have had spot-
ty records in developing new prod-
ucts internally, especially when 
venturing away from their tradi-
tional areas of strength. So they 
fill their product pipelines by pur-
chasing small companies, just 
as large pharmaceutical compa-
nies have grown through acqui-
sitions, mergers, and joint ven-
tures with small biotechnology 
companies.
The focus and nimbleness that 
have helped small companies 
succeed at invention and early 
development often prove to be 
liabilities at later stages. Large 
companies have the resources to 
shepherd products through ap-
proval by the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) and to market 
them effectively. Furthermore, 
with multiple products in their 
portfolios, they can more easily 
bear the risk that some products 
will fail. In the past, FDA approval 
has been a minor obstacle for 
many types of devices, for which 
the FDA requires documentation 
only that a new product is sub-
stantially equivalent to one al-
ready marketed. Even for genu-
inely novel devices, efficacy 
standards have not been as con-
sistently rigorous as for drugs. 
But payers, who increasingly de-
mand well-designed and well-
conducted studies to demonstrate 
effectiveness before they will pro-
vide reimbursement for a new 
device, may not be satisfied by 
the evidence used to obtain FDA 
approval.
For many small companies, 
the expense of sponsoring or con-
ducting high-quality clinical tri-
als is an insuperable barrier, and 
few have the experience to mar-
ket their products effectively. Large 
companies can finance trials that 
are large enough to demonstrate 
efficacy, and they have broad mar-
keting capabilities. By deterring 
small firms from entering the mar-
ket with products that are simi-
lar or superior to their own, large 
companies protect their market 
share — hence the growing dom-
ination of the device industry by 
a small number of companies.
Before the Guidant acquisi-
tion, Boston Scientific was among 
the top three firms manufactur-
ing only medical devices, and it 
had about $1.6 billion in annual 
sales. But it was heavily depen-
dent on drug-el uting stents for 
its revenues and near-term growth, 
and it could not expect to have 
only one major competitor for 
very long. Furthermore, it was 
vulnerable to the displacement of 
its technologies by newer ones, 
just as drug-eluting stents have 
replaced bare-metal stents, and 
both of these percutaneous inter-
ventions have reversed the growth 
in coronary-artery bypass surgery.
The purchase of Guidant made 
it possible for Boston Scientific 
to expand its device offerings into 
new areas, such as cardiac-rhythm 
management, mitigating the risk 
that a loss of market share in 
any one area would threaten its 
status as a top device firm. John-
son & Johnson, by contrast, is a 
diversified company that did not 
face the same near-term risks as 
Boston Scientific, and so it is 
not surprising that it would de-
cide that alternative growth strat-
egies were more attractive than 
purchasing Guidant at the price 
Boston Scientific was offering. 
Thus, it is plausible that the de-
cisions made by Boston Scientif-
ic and Johnson & Johnson were 
in the best interests of each 
company.
Consolidation in the medical-
device industry, like consolida-
tion in the pharmaceutical indus-
try, has multiple and sometimes 
unpredictable effects. Mergers 
and acquisitions are motivated 
in part by the belief that scale 
brings reductions in the cost of 
production and increases in the 
prices that products command. 
The resulting profitability may 
promote innovation, to the extent 
that profitable companies are 
more likely than unprofitable 
companies to invest in research 
and development. Although nov-
el devices can offer tremendous 
benefits, industry consolidation 
is not an unmixed blessing for 
patients or their physicians. Di-
minished competition usually 
means higher prices — and pos-
sibly limited treatment options. 
At least in the short term, in-
creased device-industry consoli-
dation may depress innovation by 
small companies, which may be 
deterred by the prospect of com-
petition with large manufactur-
ers. Moreover, consolidation also 
means that there will be fewer 
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large device manufacturers seek-
ing to acquire technology from 
innovative entrepreneurial firms, 
and large companies will exer-
cise their greater power as pur-
chasers by paying less to acquire 
small firms or to license their 
technology. As one venture capi-
talist told me, investors will be 
less willing to put money into de-
vice start-ups as the potential re-
turn on their investment shrinks.
Distinctions between the mar-
ket for drugs and the market for 
devices are becoming less im-
portant, as device regulation be-
comes more uniform and payers 
demand more rigorous evidence 
of efficacy. With the implemen-
tation of the Medicare prescrip-
tion-drug coverage under Part D, 
pharmaceutical companies will 
turn to Medicare for a large share 
of their revenue, much as the de-
vice industry has done for years, 
since devices, unlike drugs, were 
never categorically excluded from 
Medicare coverage. Perhaps it is 
inevitable that the device and 
drug industries will grow to re-
semble each other even more 
closely in the coming years, with 
a small number of very large com-
panies offering a broad array of 
products, whereas early research 
will be concentrated in small 
companies that seek either to li-
cense their products or be ac-
quired by large companies.
To generate the revenues need-
ed to justify the purchase of 
Guidant, Boston Scientific will 
n eed  to  charge  hi gh  p ri ces  fo r  
its devices. That will not be easy. 
Medicare’s fiscal crisis and the 
increasingly precarious state of 
private health insurance will bring 
ever-closer scrutiny of expensive 
medical care. If the strategy of 
growth by acquisition permits the 
device industry to turn scientific 
advances into effective treatments 
for patients, it will ultimately suc-
ceed in the marketplace. But if 
this strategy brings about high 
prices without corresponding ben-
efits, for patients as well as man-
ufacturers, the price of growth 
will surely have been too high.
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The Silent Epidemic — The Health Effects of Illiteracy
Erin N. Marcus, M.D., M.P.H.
H
e came in for a “tune-up.” 
He was 64 years old, with a 
“history of noncompliance,” ac-
cording to the resident, and he 
hadn’t taken his diabetes or car-
diac medications for weeks. We 
weren’t quite sure why. He was 
alert, he appeared to be intelli-
gent and interested in getting 
well, and he was able to get his 
prescriptions filled at a reduced 
cost. Before he went home, we 
explained why he needed to take 
his medicines and reviewed the 
frequency and doses with him 
several times. He told us he would 
follow up with his doctor (though 
he couldn’t remember the doctor’s 
name or telephone number) and 
left the hospital with a handwrit-
ten discharge summary.
Five months later, he appeared 
at the community clinic. He said 
he was taking his medications, 
but he wasn’t sure of their names 
or how often he took them. A 
medical student and I reviewed 
the regimen again. The student 
typed up simple instructions in 
big letters for him to follow, as 
well as a list of dates and times 
at which he should record his 
blood sugar levels. We asked him 
to come back in two weeks.
When he returned, the stu-
dent saw him first — and made 
a diagnosis that no one else had 
considered: illiteracy. The clue 
lay in the jumbled mess of his 
glucose log. Many of the sugar 
values were written next to future 
dates. We quietly asked him to 
read his list of medications aloud. 
Haltingly, he told us he couldn’t 
do it. Born in the rural South, he 
had left school in the second 
grade. He lived alone. He had been 
able to support himself as a gas-
station attendant and handyman, 
but he had never learned to read.
We were stunned. We had tried 
to avoid jargon and to use sim-
ple language in explaining our 
instructions, and he had seemed 
to understand everything we had 
told him. He had seen scores of 
doctors, nurses, and social work-
ers over the years without any-
one’s guessing he had a reading 
problem.
Although we had been blind 
to his illiteracy, our patient’s prob-
lem is not uncommon. The Na-
tional Assessment of Adult Litera-
cy (NAAL), a large survey conducted 
by the National Center for Edu-
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